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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CORPORATIONS: Alien Corporations That Domesticate in
Oklahoma May Hold Land
The Oklahoma constitution provides that nonresident aliens may not
own land in Oklahoma.' In 1979 the Attorney General of the State of
Oklahoma issued an opinion holding that this prohibition applied to alien
corporations as well as to alien natural persons.' The Attorney General Opi-
nion was followed by action to enforce the constitution's restrictions. Under
the duty imposed upon him by law, 3 the attorney general brought suit in the
District Court for Oklahoma County against Hillcrest Investments, Ltd., a
Canadian corporation.' In this suit the attorney general alleged that certain
lands were held by the defendant corporation in violation of Oklahoma
statutory law and of the Oklahoma constitution, and asked the court to find
that the lands had escheated to the state.5
The trial court gave judgment for the defendant on the grounds that
Article 22, Section 1, applied only to alien natural persons, not to alien cor-
porations.6 Article 22, Section 1, provides in pertinent part:
No alien or person who is not a citizen of the United States, shall
acquire title to or own land in this state, and the legislature shall enact
laws whereby all persons not citizens of the United States, and their
heirs, who may hereafter acquire real estate in this state . . . shall
dispose of the same within five years upon condition of escheat or
forfeiture to the State: Provided, This shall not apply . . . to aliens or
persons not citizens of the United States who may become bona fide
residents of this State. ... 7
The trial court's decision was based on the reasoning that the use of the
phrase "and their heirs" in the section was evidence of intent to limit the
meaning of "alien or person" to natural persons because only natural per-
sons have heirs.8
In State v. Hillcrest Investments, Ltd.,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court
considered the attorney general's appeal from the trial court's judgment. The
court affirmed the judgment but rejected the reasoning of the trial court. The
mere inclusion of the phrase "and his heirs" in section 1 is not logically in-
OKLA. CONsr. art. 22, § 1.
2 11 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 452 (Okla. 1979).
3 60 OKLA. STAT. § 125 (1971).
' State v. Hillcrest Inv., Ltd., No. 79-5599 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Cty.).
5Id.
As discussed in State v. Hillerest Inv., Ltd., 52 OKLA. B.J. 581, 582 (1981).
' OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § I (emphasis added).
52 OKLA. B.J. 581, 582 (1981).
Id. at 581.
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compatible with an intent to include corporate persons within the term "per-
son" and so is not sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion.' 0
The court then proceeded to analyze the terms "person" and "alien"
as they were used and understood when the state constitution was drafted.
The court noted that then, as now, "person" was generally understood to in-
clude corporations. The conclusion followed that the drafters intended to in-
clude alien corporations in the prohibition of Article 22, Section 1.11
Because the restrictions of Article 22, Section 1 apply to corporations as
well as to natural persons, the court then considered whether the defendant
was an "alien." This issue was easily resolved because it is well settled that a
corporation formed under the laws of a foreign nation is an alien.
2
Because the restrictions of Article 22, Section 1, apply to corporations
as well as to natural persons, and because the defendant was admittedly an
alien corporation, the court then reached the decisive issue in the
case-whether the defendant was a resident of Oklahoma. The proviso to the
restriction exempts those aliens who are "bona fide residents of this State."' ,
The court noted that there was ample precedent for the proposition that cor-
porations may have several residences. The court cited cases from Oklahoma
and other states in which foreign corporations had been held to have
established residence in the forum state for various purposes, such as being
subject to service of process," being entitled to claim the protection of the
statute of limitations," and so on.
Next the court noted that the constitution "provided for the licens-
ing-or domestication-of foreign corporations." 6 In addition, the constitu-
tion provides that foreign corporations shall be subject to the same restric-
tions as domestic corporations, and may be subject to further restrictions
enacted by the legislature. The court concluded that the drafters intended
that alien corporations that comply with the licensing requirements should be
treated as residents and that the drafters had given the legislature power to
decide whether to impose on such corporations the restrictions on land
ownership that are applicable to nonresident aliens. 8
Deciding that there is no constitutional bar to the ownership of land by
alien corporations that have been licensed in Oklahoma and thereby become
residents of Oklahoma, the court turned to the Oklahoma Statutes to deter-
mine whether the legislature had enacted provisions under the authority of
Article 9, Section 44, which would restrict domesticated alien corporations
from owning land."
I0 Id. at 582.
1 Id. at 583.
12 Id. at 584.
" OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1.
" Brand v. Auto Serv., 75 N.J.L. 230, 67 A. 19, 20 (1907).
St. L. & S.F. Ry. v. Taliaferro, 67 Okla. 37, 168 P. 788 (1917).
" 52 OKLA. B.J. 581, 585 (1981), citing OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 43.
" OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 44.
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The court noted section 1.119 of Title 18,20 which provides that a
foreign corporation that has been domesticated shall enjoy all rights and
privileges of a domestic corporation, and section 1.2 of the same title, 2' a sec-
tion giving definition of terms, which establishes that "foreign corporation,"
in section 1.199, includes alien corporations. The court next cited section
1.19,22 which lists the powers of domestic corporations. Subsection 6 of sec-
tion 1.19 provides that domestic corporations may acquire and hold real pro-
perty, subject to the restrictions of Article 22, Section 2 of the Oklahoma
constitution and sections 1.20 through 1.25 of Title 18.23 Article 22, Section
2, places restrictions on corporate ownership of land outside incorporated
cities and towns. 4 These limitations apply to all corporations, domestic or
foreign. Sections 120 through 125 of Title 18 codify and provide procedures
for enforcing these provisions .2
Finding that there was no statutory limitation on the ownership of ur-
ban land by domesticated alien corporations, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment for the defendant. The court warned that this holding did
not permit aliens to form "sham" corporations for the specific purpose of
evading the limitations of Article 22, Section 1 of the constitution when such
entities were not "legitimate corporations.
2 6
Two justices dissented from the decision, focusing their criticism on the
majority's holding that an alien corporation becomes a resident of the state
by complying with the licensing requirements. The dissent pointed out that
while corporations are often deemed to have a residence in a state other than
the state of incorporation, such decisions are often based on legal fictions.
The present case involves only "real and actual legal residence." ' according
to the dissent, which can only be in the state (or nation) of incorporation.
The majority's warning about sham corporations was declared to be "mean-
ingless." 
2 1
CRIMINAL LA W. Factors That May Be Taken Into Account In
Setting Appeal Bonds
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Kordelski v. Cook'
recently clarified two points with regard to appeal bonds. The court held that
the district court, and not the Court of Criminal Appeals, has jurisdiction
20 Id. at 587, 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1.199 (1971).
21 Id. at 586, 18 OKLA. SrAT. § 1.2 (Supp. 1980).
22 Id. at 587, 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1.19 (Supp. 1980).
23 Id.
24 OKLA CONST. art. 22, § 2.
21 18 OKLA. STAT. §§ 120-125 (1971).
26 52 OKLA. B.J. at 588.
27 Id. at 589.
28 Id.
1 51 O'aA. B.J. 3039 (Dec. 27, 1980).
[Vol. 34
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over all matters relating to appeal bonds under current statutes.2 This is ap-
parently so even though an appeal has been perfected, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. In Kordelski the district
court had originally set an appeal bond that it later revoked after the appeal
had been perfected.'
The second point made in the case is with reference to the factors that
the district court may validly consider in deciding whether to release a con-
victed criminal defendant on an appeal bond. The court first held that the
right to go free on bail prior to conviction-a constitutional right 4-was
distinguishable from the right to go free on bail during the pendency of an
appeal-a right created by statute.' The court noted that because of the con-
stitutional origin of the right to bail before trial, the only factor that may
validly be considered in setting bail prior to conviction is insuring the ap-
pearance of the accused.6 The court then considered the factors that may be
taken into account in granting or denying an appeals bond. The court held
that if the decision to grant bond is within the discretion of the court,7 the
court may consider factors other than the likelihood that the defendant will
leave the jurisdiction if set free. Specifically, the court held that it was not
improper for the lower court to revoke the petitioner's appeal bond on the
ground that he was a habitual criminal and a threat to the community. 8 In so
holding it overruled a previous decision that had held it was improper to con-
sider factors other than the likelihood of the defendant's reappearance. 9 The
court implied that other considerations are proper as well, but their enumera-
tion was left to future decisions.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, has adopted a broad "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,'
that is, the rule that bars the admissibility of evidence obtained by law en-
Id. The opinion cited 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1077-1079 (1971), as controlling.
'Id.
4 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 8.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1077 (1971).
6 51 OKLA. B.J. 3039, 3040 (Dec. 27, 1980), citing Petition of Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103
(Okla. Cr. 1979).
1 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1077 (1971), divides convicted defendants into three categories which
are treated differently: misdemeanor convictions and felony convictions in which only a fine is
imposed-bond will always be allowed; cases in which the judgment imposed a life sentence-
bond will never be allowed; and all other felony convictions-the granting of bond is within the
court's discretion.
1 51 OKLA. B.J. 3039, 3042 (Dec. 27, 1980).
9 Application of Love, 349 P.2d 767 (Okla. Cr. 1960).




forcement officials in contravention of the fourth amendment strictures
against illegal search and seizure.'
The case that precipitated the decision involved an arrest by a special
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. In 1976 the agent arrested
the defendant, JoAnn Williams, in Toledo, Ohio, for possession of heroin.
Williams was convicted of the offense and appealed her conviction. The
district court ordered her released pending appeal with a condition of release
being that she remain in Ohio.3 In 1977 the agent who had made the initial
arrest and who was aware of the conditions of her release observed her
deplane in Atlanta from a nonstop Los Angeles flight. As she proceeded
toward the departure gate for a flight to Kentucky he arrested her for
violating the conditions of her bond.4 In a search incidental to the arrest,
heroin and cocaine were found on her person.' A search of her luggage pur-
suant to a search warrant revealed an additional quantity of heroin.6
Indicted for this second drug offense, Williams moved to suppress the
fruits of the search of her person and luggage, claiming that the arrest was
invalid and that the resultant searches were thus invalid. An initial three-
judge panel affirmed the district court's suppression of the evidence, 7 but on
rehearing the full court determined that the arrest leading to the search was
legal. 8 Additionally, a thirteen-judge majority of the court held that even if
the arrest had not been lawful, the good faith and reasonableness of the of-
ficer in making the arrest precluded the suppression of the evidence under the
exclusionary rule.' Ten members of the court who joined in the holding that
the arrest was legal concurred specially, disagreeing with the majority in its
pronouncement of the good faith exception,' 0 finding instead that any discus-
sion of an exception where an arrest was illegal or unauthorized was inap-
propriate whereas in this case there was a legal arrest."
The majority, in adopting the good faith exception, reasoned that the
exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by police, not
reasonable or good faith ones.'" The court concluded that the exclusionary
rule would not deter reasonable, good faith actions of law enforcement of-
ficials and thus because the reason for the rule did not exist, its application
must cease also. 3
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
4 Id. at 840.
3 Id.
6 Id. at 835.
United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
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The majority found authority for its decision in commentaries' 4 and in
decisions of the United States Supreme Court where the exclusionary rule
had been ruled inapplicable in specific fact situations. 15 While none of the
cited Supreme Court decisions provided direct authority, the Fifth Circuit
found justification for good faith violations of the fourth amendment in
those decisions both where the law enforcement officer made a mistake as to
the existence of facts necessary to constitute probable cause"6 and where there
was a technical violation, i.e., reliance on a statute later declared unconstitu-
tional, a warrant which is later invalidated, or a court precedent later over-
ruled.1 7
The court defined reasonable good faith as being a belief that "in addi-
tion to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in an objective
reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulable premises suffi-
cient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained, officer to believe that he
was acting lawfully."' 8
The scope of the decision by the Fifth Circuit is exemplified by the con-
clusion stated by the court:
Henceforth, in this circuit, when evidence is sought to be excluded
because of police conduct leading to its discovery, it will be open to the
proponent of the evidence to urge that the conduct in question, if
mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in a reasonable, good-faith
belief that it was proper. If the court so finds, it shall not apply the ex-
clusionary rule to the evidence.19
The judges who specifically concurred were unwilling to agree that
deterrence of illegal conduct was the only consideration on which the exclu-
sionary rule was premised."0 The imperative of judicial integrity' and the
avoidance of the taint of official lawlessness22 were cited as considerations
which should have been examined in the majority's decision to establish a
good faith exception.
23
Additionally, the judges found that: "The announcement of a radical
change in the scope of the exclusionary rule creates a host of interpretive
" Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736
(1972),
" E.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S.
741 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
"1 United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 844-46 (5th Cir. 1980). The court cited three
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court to support its position.
17 Id. at 841, 843-44.
Id. at 841 n.4a.
" Id. at 846-47.
2I Id. at 849.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'2 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
1981]
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss1/47
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problems." 2 The judges were concerned about admissibility of evidence ob-
tained as a result of an invalid search warrant and about the applicability of
the exception to questions of fact as well as questions of law.25
Because the decision to establish a sweeping exception to the exclu-
sionary rule was announced as an alternative to the court's finding that the
arrest was legal, it is unlikely that the decision will be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.26 The decision stands as precedent in the Fifth Circuit
and provides persuasive authority in other circuits and state courts for adop-
tion of a broad-based good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
DAMAGES: Insurance for Punitive Damages
In Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided four certified questions2 of law re-
garding payment of punitive damages under insurance policies.
The plaintiff (insured), Target Stores, Inc. (Target), procured from the
defendant. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. (insurer), a personal
liability insurance policy providing in part for payment of "all sums which
the insured might become legally obligated to pay. . . . "3 While the policy
was in force and effect, Target became liable, as a result of a state court
judgment, to pay Dorothy Moore actual and punitive damages for her false
arrest by Target's agent. American Mutual paid the award of actual damages
but refused to pay the punitive damages. Target, which paid the punitive
damages award, brought suit in federal court to recover from American
Mutual the amount of that award.
In response to the four certified questions of law, the court held that:
(a) the insurance policy in the suit included coverage for punitive damages;
(b) public policy is generally contravened by coverage of punitive damages;
(c) an exception to public policy exists when the insured's liability is imposed
vicariously: and, (d) prior knowledge of an agent's propensity to commit the
wrong for which punitive damages were imposed will not bar recovery
against the insurer unless the insured may be said to have been guilty of
"gross negligence" in not discharging the "vicious" servant."
Scope of Insurance Coverage
Target's insurance policy provided for payment of "all sums which the
24 Id. at 850.
25 Id. at 850 n.4.
26 Id. at 851.
51 OKLA. B.J. 3025 (Nov. 25, 1980).
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified the
questions pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 OKLA. STAT. §
1601 (Supp. 1980).
51 OKLA. B.J. 3025, 3027 (Nov. 25, 1980).
Id. at 3025.
[Vol. 34
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insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury.' '
A split of authority exists as to the meaning of the terms, with the majority
view being that the terms of such a policy embrace liability for punitive
damages." However, the issue is resolved in various ways by courts following
the majority view. The Oregon Supreme Court treated a similar "all sums"
provision as neither an express exclusion nor a like inclusion of punitive
damages.7 Where such ambiguity existed, Oregon favored the insured.' A
federal district court, sitting in Indiana, reasoned that where the provisions
cover all sums "which the insured shall become obligated to pay" the policy
unambiguously includes all sums.9 In both cases, punitive damages that
became liquidated by judgment were considered a "sum" included in the
policy.' 0 Oklahoma agreed with Oregon's reasoning, holding that where no
language of the policy is patently ambiguous it must be construed in favor of
the insured."
Public Policy Considerations and Exceptions Thereto
The court in Dayton-Hudson formally adopted the McNulty rule.' 2 The
rule mandates that policy considerations require that where punitive damages
are awarded for punishment and deterrence, the damages rest ultimately, as
well as nominally, on the party actually responsible for the wrong.' The
Oklahoma court, however, recognized a common exception to this public
policy: It will not preclude recovery of indemnity from the insurer by an
employer who is liable for the willfullness or gross negligence of his employee
under the Oklahoma application of the respondeat superior doctrine."
Prior Knowledge of the Servant's Vicious Propensities
What if a negligence action is brought directly against the insured where
it is shown that the servant was negligently hired?" The court ruled that if
only "ordinary" negligence were present, the employer who is sued directly
in a negligence cause of action could shift his burden of punitive damages to
the insurer.' 6 But if "gross negligence" is present (and this will depend on the
I Id. at 3028 n.2 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 3026, 3028 n.5.
Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Or. 1977).
Id. at 1015.
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 94
(N.D. Ind. 1976).
51 OKLA. B.J. 3025, 3026 (Nov. 25, 1980).
Id.
I d. at 3027.
Northwestern Nat'l Gas Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
| 51 OKL. B.J. 3025, 3027 (Nov. 25, 1980). See also id. at 3030 n.19.
11 Where the employer had prior knowledge of the servant's propensity to commit the
very harm for which damages are sought, the basis of liability invoked is not respondeat superior
but rather is the employer's own negligence in not discharging the unfit servant.
1151 OKLA. B.J. 3025, 3028 (Nov. 25, 1980).
19811
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extent of the master's prior knowledge), it is the equivalent of positive
wrongdoing. Public policy would then not allow the employer to shift his
burden to the insurer.' Whether the employee was, in fact, "vicious" rather
than merely "unfit" or "erratic" is regarded as a question of fact."
OIL AND GAS: Order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission
Required for Change of Unit Operator Status
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission has the authority to order the
compulsory pooling of oil and gas interests in an established drilling and
spacing unit and to designate an operator to manage the leaseholds within
that unit pursuant to Section 87.1(e) of Title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes
(Supp. 1980). Compulsory pooling is a reasonable exercise of the state police
power to prevent waste and to protect the correlative rights of owners in a
common source of oil or gas.' In Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v.
Corporation Commission,2 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that once the
Corporation Commission designates an operator to manage a force-pooled
unit, this operator cannot transfer his operator status to another because this
would const'itute an unauthorized delegation of the responsibilities that were
imposed upon him through the exercise of the state's police powers.'
Prior to Crest, it had been the custom in the oil and gas industry for a
designated operator simply to transfer his operator authority by transferring
his operating rights to another through a private agreement if he decided not
to drill.' The only case that had dealt with this issue prior to Crest was Stoltz,
Wagner & Brown v. Duncan,5 wherein the court held that the transfer of
operating rights by a party designated as unit. Operator in a pooling order of
the Corporation Commission was an effective transfer and that it did not im-
pair any rights of owners included within the unit.
In Crest the court held that the unit operator's assignment of his
operating rights to another did not change the operator's legal status or his
liability and that, therefore, this unauthorized transfer of the operatorship
had no legal effect and was not a ground for vacating the prior force pooling
order.
6
In order to be redesignated as operator of a force-pooled unit, a person
must now apply to the Corporation Commission and introduce sufficient
" Id.
s Id.
Helmnerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Conm'n, 532 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1975).
617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980).
Id. at 217.
See Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (W.D. Okla. 1976);
Buckles v. Wil-Mc Oil Corp., 585 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Okla. 1978).
1 417 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
617 P.2d 215, 218 (Okla. 1980).
202 [Vol. 34
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proof showing that he is a prudent and competent operator.7 The Corpora-
tion Commission may then redesignate him as the operator by entering a new
order that amends its previous pooling order and which releases the prior
operator from his responsibilities."
PLEADING: Abolishing "Fact" Pleading
Section 264 of Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes (1971), provides that a pe-
tition shall contain a "statement of the facts constituting the cause of ac-
tion. . . ." This has been construed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
mean that a plaintiff should plead ultimate issue facts rather than evidentiary
'facts.' Moreover, a trial court may grant a motion to strike evidentiary facts
from a petition. 2 Nevertheless, in a recent case the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that "allegations that the property had been 'platted' [were insuffi-
cient] where such allegations were unattended by allegations of fact to sup-
port them." 3 Thus, the court held that in addition to pleading ultimate facts,
a plaintiff must plead the evidence on which he relies to support his ultimate
facts.
This case furnishes another reason for changing the requirements of
Section 264. The second part of this section should be amended to read as
follows:
Second. A short statement of the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language, and without repetition. Allegations that are infor-
mative are sufficient although they may constitute conclusions of law,
and it shall not be necessary for a plaintiff to plead his evidence.
The word "facts" was omitted because of the difficulty that judges and
attorneys have had distinguishing between facts and conclusions of law."
However, the phrase "cause of action" was retained because it has not caused
7 See Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215
(Okla. 1980); Gose v. Corporation Comm'n, 460 P.2d 118 (Okla. 1969).
1 Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215 (Okla.
1980); Gose v. Corporation Comm'n, 460 P.2d 118 (Okla. 1969).
Soper v. Enid Hotel Co., 383 P.2d 7 (Okla. 1963); Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla. 4, 190
P.2d 451 (1948); City of Guthrie v. Finch, 13 Okla. 496, 75 P. 288 (1904). See C. CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 225 (2d ed. 1947).
2 Jones v. Novotny, 352 P.2d 905 (Okla. 1960); Cahill v. Pine Creek Oil Co., 40 Okla.
176, 136 P. 1100 (1913).
1 Chandler v. Independent School No. 12, 52 OKLA. B.J. 252, 254 (Feb. 7, 1981). The
court cited Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance, Inc., 455 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1969), as authority for
this proposition. However, this case involves a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for a
directed verdict although the opinion is confusing because it refers to allegations and facts well
pled.
4The requirement that a plaintiff must plead facts "has worked least successfully of all
the reforms made." C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 23 (2d ed. 1947). See also id. at 242. Judge
Clark did not criticize the use of the phrase "cause of action."
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss1/47
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difficulties in Oklahoma and, as a result of numerous decisions, it has an
established meaning in this state.' Therefore, substituting other language that
means the same thing is undesirable.
Federal Rule 8(a)(2) provides that the complaint should contain a
"statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' (em-
phasis added). This statement would be appropriate but for the fact that
many attorneys believe that it only requires a plaintiff to give notice of the
nature of his action. However, more is necessary; the plaintiff must show
that there is a legal basis for recovery. "While the rules have substituted
'claim' or 'claim for relief' in lieu of the older and troublesome term 'cause
of action,' the pleading must still state a 'cause of action' in the sense that it
must show 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' "I The Federal Rules Ad-
visory Committee stated, "That Rule 8(a) envisages the statement of cir-
cumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented is
clearly indicated. . . .'" Therefore, the phrase "cause of action" should be
retained so that plaintiffs would realize that they must show the existence of
the essential elements of their claims.' Some other states that revised their
rules of procedure after the Federal Rules were promulgated have retained
the phrase "cause of action. ' 9 Also, use of the word "claim" by the Federal
Rules has not reduced the number of objections to the sufficiency of com-
plaints that are filed in federal courts.
I E.g., Town of Braggs v. Slape, 207 Okla. 420, 250 P.2d 214 (1942); Pugh-Bishop
Chevrolet Co. v. Duncan, 176 Okla. 310, 55 P.2d 1003 (1936).
6 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8-116-7 (2d ed. 1979). This statement is quoted with
approval by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2273 n.15
(1979). Accord, C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 121-4 (1969).
2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.01131 (1979).
Because a plaintiff must prove the existence of each of the essential elements of his
claim or cause of action, requiring him to plead them should assist him in preparing for trial.
The difference between a claim and a cause of action is one of name only. Federal courts and
courts in states that have adopted the Federal Rules often use the phrase "cause of action" in
their opinions rather than the word "claim." Davis v. Passman, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2273 (1979). See,
e.g., Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943);
Metropolitan Gas Repair Serv., Inc. v. Kulik, 621 P.2d 313, 319 (Colo. 1981); Pocatello Indus.
Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 621 P.2d 399, 402 (Idaho 1980); Seven Seas Import-Export & Mer-
cantile, Inc. v. Handee Foods, Inc., 621 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Mont. 1981).
' ILL. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 33 (1954) provides that, "All pleadings shall contain a plain
and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action, counterclaim, defense or reply." N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 3013 (1962) provides that, "Statements in a pleading shall be suffi-
ciently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of
transactions or occurrences intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of ac-
tion or defense." TEx. CT. R. 47(a) (1977) provides that a petition shall contain "a short state-
ment of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved."
204 [Vol. 34
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